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omeowners typically have the option to pre-
pay all or part of the outstanding balance of
their mortgage loan at any time, usually
without penalty. However, unless homeown-
ers have sufficient wealth to pay off the balance, they must
obtain a new loan in order to exercise this option. Studies
examining refinancing behavior are finding more and more
evidence that differences in homeowners’ ability to qualify for
new mortgage credit, as well as differences in the cost of that
credit, account for a significant part of the observed variation
in that behavior. Therefore, individual homeowner and prop-
erty characteristics, such as personal credit ratings and changes
in home equity, must be considered systematically, along with
changes in mortgage interest rates, in the analysis and predic-
tion of mortgage prepayments.
Early research into the factors influencing prepay-
ments focused almost exclusively on the difference between
the interest rate on a homeowner’s existing mortgage and
the rates available on new loans. This approach arose in part
because researchers most often had to rely on aggregate
data on the pools of mortgages serving as the underlying
collateral for mortgage-backed securities (for example, see
Schorin [1992]). More recent research, however, has
broadened the scope of this investigation through the uti-
lization of loan-level data sets that include individual
property, loan, and borrower characteristics.
This article significantly advances the literature on
mortgage prepayments by introducing quantitative measures
of individual homeowner credit histories to the loan-level
analysis of the factors influencing the probability that a home-
owner will refinance. In addition to credit histories, we include
in the analysis changes in individual homeowner’s equity and in
the overall lending environment. Our findings strongly support
the hypothesis that, other things being equal, the worse a home-
owner’s credit rating, the lower the probability that he or she
will refinance. We also confirm the finding of other researchers
that changes in home equity strongly influence the probability
of refinancing. Finally, we provide evidence of a change in the
lending environment that, all else being equal, has
increased the probability that a homeowner will refinance. 
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These findings are important from an investment
risk management perspective because they confirm that the
responsiveness of mortgage cash flows to changes in inter-
est rates will also be significantly influenced by the credit
and equity conditions of individual borrowers. Moreover,
evidence overwhelmingly indicates that these conditions
are subject to dramatic changes. For example, although the
sharp rise in personal bankruptcies since the mid-1980s
(Chart 1) partly reflects changes in laws and attitudes, it
nonetheless suggests that credit histories for a growing
segment of the population are deteriorating. Furthermore,
home price movements, the key determinant of changes in
homeowners’ equity, have differed considerably over time
and in various regions of the country. Indeed, in the early to
mid-1990s home price appreciation for the United States as
a whole slowed dramatically while home prices actually fell
for sustained periods in a few regions (Chart 2).
In short, as mortgage rates fell during the first half
of the 1990s, many households likely found it difficult, if
not impossible, to refinance existing mortgages because of
poor credit ratings or erosion of home equity.1 Conse-
quently, the prepayment experience of otherwise similar pools
of mortgage loans may vary greatly depending on the pools’
proportions of credit- and/or equity-constrained borrowers.
Our findings also contribute to an understanding of
how constraints on credit availability affect the transmission of
monetary policy to the economy (for example, see Bernanke
[1993]). Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and others have
found that investment expenditures by credit-constrained
businesses are especially closely tied to those firms’ cash flows
and are relatively insensitive to changes in interest rates,
reflecting constraints on their ability to obtain credit. Analo-
gously, we find credit- and/or equity-constrained homeowners
to be less sensitive to changes in interest rates because of their
limited access to new credit, thereby short-circuiting one
channel through which lower interest rates improve household
cash flows and stimulate the economy.
As mortgage rates fell during the first half of 
the 1990s, many households likely found it 
difficult, if not impossible, to refinance existing 
mortgages because of poor credit ratings or
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PREVIOUS LOAN-LEVEL RESEARCH
ON MORTGAGE PREPAYMENTS
Recognition that individual loan, property, and borrower
characteristics, in addition to changes in interest rates, play
a key role in determining the likelihood of a mortgage pre-
payment has spawned a relatively new branch of research
based on loan-level data sets. This research has generally
focused on the three major underwriting criteria that mort-
gage lenders consider when deciding whether to extend
credit: equity (collateral), income, and credit history.
However, past studies have only investigated the
effects of changes in homeowners’ equity and income on their
ability to prepay. For example, Cunningham and Capone
(1990)—using a sample of loans secured by properties
in the Houston, Texas, area—estimated post-origination
loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and post-origination payment-
to-income ratios based on changes in regional home prices
and incomes.2 They concluded that post-origination equity
was a key determinant of the termination experience of
those loans (they found an inverse relationship for defaults
and a positive relationship for refinancings and home sales),
whereas post-origination income was insignificant. Caplin,
Freeman, and Tracy (1993), using a sample of loans secured
by properties in six states, also found evidence of the
importance of home equity in influencing the likelihood of
mortgage prepayment. They assessed the effect of
post-origination equity by dividing their sample into states
with stable or weak property markets (using transaction-based
home price indexes for specific metropolitan statistical areas)
and according to whether the loans had high or low
original LTV ratios. Consistent with the hypothesis that
changes in home equity play an important role in pre-
payments, the authors found that in states with weak
property markets, prepayment activity was less respon-
sive to declines in mortgage interest rates than in states
with stable property markets.
In a related study, Archer, Ling, and McGill
(1995) found that home equity had an important effect on
the probability that a loan would be refinanced, and pro-
vided evidence that changes in borrower income are also a
significant factor. The authors matched records from the
1985 and 1987 national samples of the American Housing
Survey to derive a subsample of nonmoving owner-occupant
households with fixed-rate primary mortgages, some of
whom had refinanced, since the interest rate on their loan
in 1987 was different from that reported in 1985. The
authors’ estimate of post-origination home equity was
derived from the sum of the book value of a homeowner’s
entire mortgage debt, including second mortgages and
home equity loans, divided by the owner’s assessment of
the current value of his or her property.3 In addition,
a post-origination mortgage payment-to-income ratio,
derived from the homeowner’s recollection of total house-
hold income, was included as an explanatory variable. The
authors found that, along with changes in interest rates,
post-origination home equity and income were significant
and of the expected sign. 
This article goes beyond the existing literature in
several important respects. Ours is the first study to inves-
tigate systematically the effect of the third underwriting
criterion: homeowners’ credit histories. Ours is also the
first study to estimate post-origination equity by using
county-level repeat sales home price indexes.4 These
indexes are generally regarded as the best available indica-
tor of movements in home prices over time. In addition,
we employ a unique loan-level data set that not only pro-
vides information on credit history but also identifies the
reason for prepayment: refinance, sale, or default (see box).
The size of the data set allows very large samples to be
drawn for major population centers as well as for the
nation as a whole. 
Ours is the first study to investigate
systematically the effect of . . . homeowners’ 
credit histories. Ours is also the first study 
to estimate post-origination equity by using 
county-level repeat sales home price indexes.THE DATA SET AND SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION
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The data for this study were provided by the Mortgage Research
Group (MRG) of Jersey City, New Jersey, which in the early
1990s entered into a strategic alliance with TRW—one of the
country’s three largest credit bureaus—to provide data for
research on mortgage finance issues. Until late 1996, MRG
maintained a data base, arranged into “tables,” of roughly
42 million residential properties located in 396 counties in
36 states. The primary table is the transaction table, which is
based on the TRW Redi Property Data data base. This table is
organized by properties, with a detailed listing of the major char-
acteristics of all transactions pertaining to each property. For the
roughly 42 million properties covered, information is provided
on 150 million to 200 million transactions. For example, if a
property is purchased, a purchase code is entered along with key
characteristics of the transaction, including date of closing, pur-
chase price, original mortgage loan balance, and maturity and
type of mortgage (such as fixed-rate, adjustable-rate, or balloon).
The characteristics of any subsequent transactions are
also recorded, such as a refinancing of the original mortgage,
another purchase of the same property, and, for some counties, a
default. The primary sources of this information are the records
of county recorders and tax assessors, which are surveyed on a
regular basis to keep the transaction data current. 
A separate table contains periodic snapshots of the credit
histories of the occupants of the properties. The data on credit histo-
ries are derived from TRW Information Services, the consumer
credit information group of TRW.  The data include summary mea-
sures of individuals’ credit status as well as detailed delinquency
information on numerous categories of credit sources. Individual
records in the credit table can be linked to records in the transaction
table on the basis of property identification numbers.
For our study, a sample from the larger data set was
constructed in several stages:  First, we selected groups of coun-
ties representing the 4 major regions of the country. In the East,
we chose 4 counties surrounding New York City (Orange County
in New York State, and Essex, Bergen, and Monmouth Counties in
New Jersey). In the South, we chose 6 counties in central Florida
(Citrus, Clay, Escambia, Hernando, Manatee, and Marion). In the
Midwest, we chose Cook County and 5 surrounding counties in
Illinois (Dekalb, DuPage, Kane, McHenry, and Ogle).  In the
West, we selected Los Angeles, Ventura, and Riverside Counties
in California. Selecting these 4 diverse areas assured us that our
statistical findings would be general rather than specific to a par-
ticular housing market. Furthermore, over the past decade, the
behavior of home prices in the 4 regions has been quite different.
In the 19 counties examined, we identified for each
property the most recent purchase transaction, going back as far as
January 1984. The mortgages on some of these properties were sub-
sequently refinanced, in some cases more than once, while other
properties had no further transactions recorded through the end of
our sample period, December 1994. (For multiple refinancings, we
considered just the first one. In addition, we excluded from the
sample loans that subsequently defaulted.) Thus, the sample con-
sisted of loans that were refinanced and loans that were not
refinanced as of the end of the sample period, establishing the
zero/one, refinance/no-refinance dependent variable we then try
to explain.  (For refinanced loans, the new loan could be greater
than, equal to, or less than the remaining balance on the old loan.)
We limited our sample to fixed-rate mortgages outstanding for a
year or more; the decision to refinance alternative mortgage types is
more complex to model and is not treated in this study.
In the final step, MRG agreed to link credit records as
of the second quarter of 1995 to a random sample of these prop-
erties. (Note that any information that would enable users of this
data set to identify an individual or a property was masked by
MRG.)  The resulting sample consisted of 12,855 observations,
of which slightly under one-third were refinanced.
Our sample is an extensive cross section, with each
observation representing the experience of an individual mortgage
loan over a well-defined time period. For example, assume that
an individual purchased a house in January 1991 and subse-
quently refinanced in December 1993, an interval of 36 months.
This window represents one observation or experiment in our
sample. Our approach differs from that of most other studies on
this topic in that the starting date, ending date, and time interval
between refinancings are unique for each observation. Starting
dates (purchases) range from January 1984 to December 1993,
while time intervals (loan ages) range from 12 to 120 months.
Therefore, our sample includes refinancings that occurred in the
“refi wave” from 1986 to early 1987 as well as in the wave from
1993 to early 1994, although most are from the latter period.
This diverse sample allows us to investigate whether the propensity
to refinance has changed over time.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1997 87
MODELING THE DECISION TO REFINANCE
When a homeowner refinances, he or she exercises the call
option imbedded in the standard residential mortgage con-
tract. In theory, a borrower will exercise this option when it
is “in the money,” that is, when refinancing would reduce
the current market value of his or her liabilities by an
amount equal to or greater than the costs of carrying out
the transaction. In fact, however, many borrowers with
apparently in-the-money options fail to exercise them
while others exercise options that apparently are not in the
money. This heterogeneity of behavior appears to be due
partly to differences in homeowners’ ability to secure
replacement financing. If an individual cannot qualify for a
new mortgage, or can qualify only at an interest rate much
higher than that available to the best credit risks, then refi-
nancing may not be possible or worthwhile even though at
first glance the option appears to be in the money.
While a decline in equity resulting from a drop in
property value may rule out refinancing for some home-
owners, refinancing may also not be possible or worthwhile
because the homeowner’s personal credit history is mar-
ginal or poor. This condition either prevents the borrower
from obtaining replacement financing or raises the cost of
that financing such that the present value of the benefits
does not offset the transaction costs. Not only might the
interest rate available exceed that offered to individuals
with perfect credit ratings, but transaction costs might also
be higher. In addition to paying higher out-of-pocket clos-
ing costs, the credit-impaired borrower may be asked to
provide substantially more personal financial information
and may face a substantially longer underwriting process.
Of course, other factors may explain this heterogeneity
of refinancing behavior. For instance, homeowners often refi-
nance when the option is not in the money in order to take
equity out of the property. After all, mortgage debt is typically
the lowest cost debt consumers can obtain, particularly on an
after-tax basis. Conversely, some homeowners who are not
equity-, credit-, or income-constrained choose not to exercise
options that appear to be in the money. There are several possi-
ble reasons for such behavior. For instance, a homeowner who
expected to move in the near future might not have enough
time to recoup the transaction costs of refinancing.
In our model of refinancing, the dependent variable
is a discrete binary indicator that assumes the value of 1
when the homeowner refinances and zero otherwise. We
use logit analysis to estimate the effect of various explanatory
variables on the probability that a loan will be refinanced.
The explanatory variables may be categorized as (1) market
interest rates and other factors in the lending environment
affecting the cost, both financial and nonfinancial, of carry-
ing out a refinancing transaction, (2) the credit history of
the homeowner, and (3) an estimate of the post-origination
LTV ratio. In addition, as in most prepayment models, we
include the number of months since origination (or the
“age” of the mortgage) to capture age-correlated effects not
stemming from equity, credit, or the other explanatory
variables. (See the appendix for further explanation of logit
analysis and how it is applied in this case.) More details on
the definition and specification of these variables follow;
Table 1 presents summary statistics. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Table 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Mean
Explanatory Variable Description  Refinancings Nonrefinancings
WRSTNOW Worst current credit status (1=good credit, 30, 60, 90, 120, 150, 180, 400=default) 26.5 42.5
WRSTEVER Worst credit status ever (1=good credit, 30, 60, 90, 120, 150, 180, 400=default) 64.9 101.0
SPREAD Coupon rate minus prevailing market rate (percentage points) 1.66 1.30
LTV   Current loan-to-value ratio (percent) 67.6 74.3
HSD  Historical standard deviation (percent) 0.11 0.11
AGE Loan maturity (years) 4.90 5.44
LE Lending environment measured by change in transaction costs (percent) 0.24 0.13
Memo: 
    Related variables Original purchase price of house (thousands of dollars) 150 129
Original loan balance  (thousands of dollars) 104 10388 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1997
Source:  Authors’ calculations.














THE INCENTIVE TO REFINANCE
Theory suggests that homeowners will refinance if the
benefits of doing so—that is, the reduction in after-tax
mortgage interest payments over the expected life of the
loan—exceed the transaction costs of obtaining a new loan.
Accordingly, measuring the strength of the incentive to
refinance involves a comparison of the contract rate on the
existing mortgage with the rate that could be obtained on
a new mortgage. In addition, account should be taken of
transaction costs (such as discount points and assorted clos-
ing costs), the opportunity cost of the time spent shopping
for and qualifying for a new loan, and interest rate volatil-
ity, which influences the value of the call option.5 
There are many ways to measure the strength of
the incentive to refinance, none of which is perfect (see, for
example, Richard and Roll [1989]). In this study, we
employ the simplest of them—the spread between the con-
tract rate on the existing loan (C) and the prevailing market
rate (R), that is: 
SPREADt = C – Rt,
where (t) represents the time period. For all observations in
our sample, C is the Freddie Mac national average commit-
ment (contract) rate on fixed-rate loans for the month in
which the existing loan closed.6 This is the so-called
A-paper rate, or the rate available to the best credit risks.
Likewise, for those homeowners who did refinance, R is
also the national average A-paper contract rate for the
month in which the new loan closed.
While SPREAD is a simple measure and tends to
represent the way homeowners think about the refinancing
decision, it has some drawbacks. First, it does not explicitly
account for transaction costs, which are likely to vary across
borrowers and over time. However, one could imagine that
transaction costs create an implicit critical threshold of
SPREAD, say 100 to 150 basis points, that must be
exceeded to trigger a refinancing. Another drawback of
SPREAD is that it does not take into account the fact that
the financial benefit of refinancing is a function of the
expected life of the new loan. However, experimentation
with alternative measures that do explicitly account for
transaction costs and holding period revealed that the
effects of creditworthiness and home equity on the proba-
bility that a loan will be refinanced are insensitive to the
measure employed.7
An important issue that arises when using
SPREAD in cross-sectional analysis is the assignment of
the value of R to those individuals who did not refinance.
Several possible approaches exist for assigning a value, and
there is a certain amount of arbitrariness in selecting any
particular one.8 In tackling this problem, we noted that
those who did refinance rarely did so at the largest spread
(the lowest value of R) that occurred over the period from
their original purchase to the date they refinanced (Chart 3).
If all the values of SPREAD observed over that period
were ranked from highest to lowest, on average those
who refinanced did so at about the seventy-fifth percen-
tile. Accordingly, we assigned nonrefinancers the value of
R associated with the seventy-fifth percentile of spreads
observed over the period from the date of original purchase
to the end of our sample period (December 1994).
Note that by basing C and R on the A-paper rate,
we explicitly excluded from SPREAD any influences that
individual borrower characteristics might have on the
actual values of particular individuals. The effects of those
individual characteristics are captured by the credit and equity
variables, as well as by the error term. In addition, we ignored
the fact that the values of  C and R for any one individual areFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1997 89
Source:  Federal Housing Finance Board.
Initial Fees and Charges on Conventional Loans Closed
Chart 4
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likely to deviate somewhat from the national average because
of regional differences in mortgage interest rates or differences
in the shopping and bargaining skills of refinancers.
VOLATILITY
As noted above, standard option theory suggests that there
is value associated with not exercising the option to refi-
nance that is increasing with the expected future volatility
of interest rates. Assuming that one can correctly measure
expected future volatility, theory also suggests that, when
included in a model such as ours, volatility should have a
negative sign. That is, higher volatility should reduce the
probability that a loan will be refinanced. The expected
effect of volatility has been found in some studies on this
topic. For example, Giliberto and Thibodeau (1989), who
measure volatility as the variance of monthly averages of
mortgage interest rates over their sample period, find that
greater volatility tends to increase the age of a mortgage
(and decrease prepayments). In contrast, Caplan, Freeman,
and Tracy (1993) find their measure of expected future
volatility to be insignificant and drop it from their analysis.
Although the theoretical effect of expected future
volatility on the probability that a loan will be refinanced
is negative, actual volatility during a given time period
should correlate positively with the probability of refinanc-
ing during that period. That is, if market interest rates
during the relevant interval are relatively volatile, a
homeowner will be more likely to observe an opportunity
to refinance than if rates are relatively stable.
To capture this effect, we include as an explanatory
variable the historical standard deviation (HSD) of market
rates during the time interval from purchase to refinancing
or from purchase to the end of the sample period. HSD is
measured as the standard deviation of the ten-year Treasury
bond rate. We expect this variable to be directly related to
the probability that a loan will be refinanced.
LENDING ENVIRONMENT
As noted by many industry experts, between the late 1980s
and the early 1990s, the mortgage lending industry
became more aggressive in soliciting refinancings. To
encourage refinancing, mortgage servicers began contact-
Between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, 
the mortgage lending industry became more 
aggressive in soliciting refinancings.
ing customers with spreads above some threshold, often as
low as 50 basis points, and informing them of the opportu-
nity and benefits of refinancing. Transaction costs declined
as competing lenders reduced points and fees (Chart 4).
Indeed, many lenders began offering loans with no
out-of-pocket costs to borrowers. “Psychic” transaction
costs were also reduced as lenders introduced mortgage
programs that minimized the financial documentation
required of borrowers (“no doc” or “low doc” programs)
and drastically shortened the periods from application to
approval and from approval to closing. This change in the
lending environment likely increased the probability of a
loan being refinanced, all else being equal.
To capture this effect, we introduce an explanatory
variable termed lending environment (LE). LE is defined as
the change in the average level of points and fees (expressed
as a percentage of the loan amount) on conventional fixed-90 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1997
rate loans closed between the time of the original purchase
and either refinancing or the end of the sample period.
PERSONAL CREDITWORTHINESS
Since credit history is a key determinant of mortgage loan
approval, it clearly should have some bearing on the likeli-
hood that a loan will be refinanced. However, because of a
lack of data, this effect has never before been quantified.
Our study is able to overcome this obstacle. The Mortgage
Research Group (MRG)—the source of most of our data—
has matched complete TRW credit reports to the individ-
ual property records that make up our sample of loans
(see box). Using this matched data, we are able to test our
hypothesis that, other things being equal, the worse an
individual’s credit rating, the lower the probability that he
or she will refinance a mortgage, either because the home-
owner cannot qualify for a new loan or because the interest
rate and transaction costs at which he or she can qualify are
too high to make it financially worthwhile.
The most general measure of an individual’s
credit history presented in the TRW reports is the total
number of “derogatories.”9 A derogatory results from
one of four events:
• a charge off: when a lender, after making a reasonable
attempt to collect a debt, has deemed it uncollectible
and has elected to declare it a bad debt loss for tax
purposes. There are no hard and fast rules specifying
when a lender can elect to charge off a debt or what
represents a reasonable effort to collect. A charge off
may result from a bankruptcy, but most often it is
simply the result of persistent delinquency.
• a collection: when a lender has enlisted the services of
a collection agency in an effort to collect the debt.
• a lien: a claim on property securing payment of a
debt. A lien (for example, a tax lien or mechanics lien)
is a public derogatory because it is effected through
the courts and is a matter of public record.
• a judgment: a claim on the income and assets of an
individual stemming from a civil law suit. Like a lien,
a judgment is a public derogatory.
Somewhat more specific indicators of an individ-
ual’s credit history are the worst now (WRSTNOW) and
worst ever (WRSTEVER) summary measures across all
credit lines. As the names imply, these variables capture an
individual’s worst payment performance across all sources
of credit as of some moment in time (now) and over the
individual’s entire credit history (ever). At the extremes,
either variable can take on a value of 1 (all credit lines are
current) or a value of 400 (a debt has been charged off).
Intermediate values capture the number of days a sched-
uled payment has been late: 30 (a scheduled payment on
one or more credit lines is thirty days late), 60, 90, or
120.10 Note that a 400 constitutes a derogatory, whereas
some lesser indicator of credit deterioration, such as a 90 or
120, does not. 
To clarify how the WRSTNOW and WRSTEVER
measures are used to assess an individual’s credit status, we
offer the example of a homeowner who has three credit
lines—a home mortgage, a credit card, and an auto loan
(Table 2). At the beginning of the homeowner’s credit his-
tory (t-11), all three credit lines are current, giving the
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Table 2
SAMPLE CREDIT HISTORY OF INDIVIDUAL HOMEOWNER
HOMEOWNER’S CREDIT LINES
Mortgage 1 1 1 30 1 30 30 30 30 1 1 1
C r e d i t  c a r d 1 3 0 6 0 9 0 1 2 0 4 0 0 ------
Auto loan 1 1 30 60 30 60 90 60 30 30 1 1
SUMMARY MEASURE OF HOMEOWNER’S CREDIT HISTORY
Worst ever 1 30 60 90 120 400 400 400 400 400 400 400
Worst now 1 30 60 90 120 400 90 60 30 30 1 1
t-11 t-10 t-9 t-8 t-7 t-6 t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t
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homeowner WRSTNOW and WRSTEVER values of 1. For
some reason—perhaps loss of employment, illness, or
divorce—this individual begins to experience some diffi-
culty meeting scheduled payments on a timely basis. The
credit card payment due becomes 120 days late in period
t-7, prompting the lender to charge off that debt in period
t-6, at which point both WRSTNOW and WRSTEVER
take on a value of 400. Eventually, this individual gets all
credit lines current again, bringing WRSTNOW down to 1
by period t-1. However, WRSTEVER remains at 400
because of the charge off of the credit card debt in period t-6.
Indeed, once someone experiences credit difficulties, his or
her credit history is likely to be affected for a long time. 
We now examine a cross tabulation of the
WRSTNOW and WRSTEVER values for all individuals in
our sample (Table 3). For WRSTNOW, 85.5 percent of the
sample have a value of 1 while 8.0 percent have a value of
400. Values from 30 to 120 represent just 6.5 percent of the
total. In contrast, for WRSTEVER, 18.4 percent of the sample
have a value of 400 while just 52.9 percent have a value of 1.
Thus, although at any point in time nearly nine of every ten
individuals have a perfect credit rating (WRSTNOW=1), at
some time in their credit history roughly half the population
experienced something less than a perfect credit rating
(WRSTEVER>1). In fact, 8.0 percent have a WRSTNOW
of 1 but a WRSTEVER of 400.11
The ideal data set for determining the effect of
credit history on the probability that a loan will be
refinanced would include a credit snapshot as of the date
the home was originally purchased and periodic updates,
perhaps once per quarter, as the loan ages. With this infor-
mation, the researcher could determine whether the home-
owner’s credit history had deteriorated since the purchase
of the home. Unfortunately, data sets that link property
transaction data with credit histories are a relatively new
phenomenon, so these periodic updates of the credit his-
tory are not yet available. As a second-best alternative, we
use one credit snapshot—as of the second quarter of
1995—that includes both a current (WRSTNOW) and
a backward-looking (WRSTEVER) credit measure. We
included these measures of creditworthiness in numerous
specifications of our logit model and, regardless of specifica-
tion, found that they were both statistically and economi-
cally significant in determining refinancing probability.
Moreover, by comparing WRSTNOW with WRSTEVER,
we were able to identify cases where a mortgagor’s credit his-
tory had improved over time, and found some evidence that
improvement reduced, but did not completely overcome,
the negative impact of a WRSTEVER value of 400.12
POST-ORIGINATION HOME EQUITY
In addition to a poor credit history, another factor that
could prevent a homeowner from refinancing, regardless of
how far interest rates have fallen, is a decline in property
value that significantly erodes that owner’s equity. For
example, if a homeowner originally made a 20 percent
down payment (origination LTV ratio=80 percent), a
15 percent decline in property value following the date of
purchase would push the post-origination LTV ratio to nearly
95 percent, typically the maximum allowable with conven-
tional financing. Loan underwriters would likely be concerned
that the recent downward trend in property values would con-
tinue and therefore would be reluctant to approve such a loan.
In addition, an LTV ratio exceeding 80 percent
would typically require some form of mortgage insurance,
which would increase transaction costs and reduce the
effective interest rate spread by as much as 25 to 50 basis
points. If the original LTV ratio was greater than 80 per-
cent, correspondingly smaller declines in property value
would have similar effects. In contrast, increases in prop-
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Note:  Figures in table represent the percentage of the sample that has the
indicated combination of worst now and worst ever measures.
Table 3
CROSS TABULATION OF WORST NOW AND WORST EVER 
CREDIT HISTORIES FOR HOMEOWNERS IN THE SAMPLE
Worst Now
Worst Ever 1 30 60 90 120 400 Total
1 52.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 52.9
30 15.2 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.4
60 5.9 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1
90 1.7 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 2.4
120 1.8 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.0 2.9
400 8.0 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.7 8.0 18.4
  Total 85.5 3.0 1.3 0.9 1.3 8.0 100.092 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1997
erty value would likely raise the probability of refinancing.
Greater equity simply makes it easier for homeowners to
qualify for a loan since the lender is exposed to less risk. It
may also increase the incentive to refinance for homeown-
ers who wish to take equity out of their property (known as
a cash-out refinancing). Furthermore, if price appreciation
substantially lowers the post-origination LTV ratio, a bor-
rower may be able to use refinancing to reduce or eliminate
the cost of mortgage insurance, thereby increasing the
effective interest rate spread. 
To capture the effect of changes in home equity on
the probability of refinancing, we enter an estimate of the
post-origination LTV ratio as an explanatory variable. The
LTV ratio’s numerator is the amortized balance of the orig-
inal first mortgage on the property, calculated by using
standard amortization formulas for fixed-rate mortgages
and the interest rate assigned to that loan, as discussed
above.13 The denominator is the original purchase price
indexed using the Case Shiller Weiss repeat sales home
price index for the county in which the property is located.
While repeat sales home price indexes are not completely
free of bias, they are superior to other indicators in tracking
the movements in home prices over time. This approach
allows us to calculate a post-origination LTV ratio for each
month from the date of purchase to either the date of refi-
nance or the end of the sample period.
For loans that were refinanced, the post-origination
LTV ratio used is the estimate for the month in which the
refinance loan closed. However, as in the case of interest
rate R, a value of the post-origination LTV ratio must be
assigned to those observations that did not refinance. We
noted that, on average, homeowners who refinanced did so at
the forty-fifth percentile of values of the LTV ratio observed
from the date of purchase to the date of refinance. On the
basis of this observation, the LTV ratio assigned to those who
did not refinance is the average over the entire period from
the date of purchase to the end of the sample period.
We should note that virtually all of the movement
in the LTV ratio is the result of changes in the value of the
home. The amount of amortization of the original balance
of a mortgage is relatively modest over the typical life of
the mortgages in our sample. In contrast, over the time
period represented by this sample, home price movements
have been quite dramatic in some regions. For example, the
Case Shiller Weiss repeat sales indexes suggest that home
prices in the California counties included in our sample
declined by roughly 30 percent from 1990 to 1995. 
 AGE OR “BURNOUT”
The actual prepayment performance of mortgage pools typi-
cally shows an increase in the conditional prepayment rate
during roughly the first fifty to sixty months, at which point
loans are described as being “seasoned.” As the aging process
continues, the remaining loans in a pool become quite
resistant to prepayment, even with strong incentives—a
phenomenon known as burnout. To capture this effect, most
prepayment studies include the age of the loan or the number
of months since origination as an explanatory variable.
One explanation for burnout is that homeowners
prevented from refinancing by credit, equity, and/or
income constraints come to dominate mortgage pools over
time as homeowners who are not similarly constrained refi-
nance or sell their homes. To the extent that our equity and
credit variables capture this effect, the age of the loan per
se should be less important than it would be in a model
that does not include those variables. However, recognizing
that credit and equity may not capture all age-correlated
effects, we also include AGE as an explanatory variable.
Because the effect of aging may not be a simple linear one,
we also include age squared (AGESQ). In comparing the
frequency distribution of AGE for homeowners who refi-
nanced with the corresponding distribution for homeown-
In addition to a poor credit history, another
factor that could prevent a homeowner from
refinancing, regardless of how far interest rates 
have fallen, is a decline in property value that 
significantly erodes that owner’s equity.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1997 93
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
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“1” represents one to two years of age; “2,” two to three years of age; and so on. 
ers who did not, we see that the general shape of these
distributions is similar—although, as one would expect,
the proportion of higher AGE values is greater for nonrefi-
nancers than for refinancers (Chart 5).14 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Logit estimations of our model for the entire sample—that
is, all regions combined—appear in Table 4. We account
for the effect of credit on the probability of refinancing by
dividing the sample into three subsamples: individuals
with values of WRSTNOW equal to 1 (good credits),
individuals with WRSTNOW between 30 and 120 (mar-
ginal credits), and individuals with WRSTNOW equal
to 400 (bad credits). We then estimate our model for each
of the subsamples while dropping the credit history vari-
able. We eliminate this variable because variations in mar-
ket interest rates relative to the contract rate on a
homeowner’s existing mortgage would have a greater effect
on the refinancing probability of a borrower with a perfect
credit history than on one with serious credit difficulties.
This variability in responsiveness suggests that there
should be significant interactions between credit history
and the other explanatory variables, particularly SPREAD.
In addition, it is not clear whether the credit variables
WRSTNOW and WRSTEVER should be viewed as con-
tinuous, such as crude credit scores, or as categorical.15
Our results confirm that credit history has a marked
effect on the probability of refinancing. The coefficient on
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Note:  Figures in parentheses are chi-square statistics.
aPseudo R-squared is defined in Estrella (1997).
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 4
LOGIT ANALYSIS OF FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DECISION
TO REFINANCE, BY CREDIT CATEGORY: ALL REGIONS





CONSTANT 1.187*** 3.292*** 2.245***
(56.29) (20.51) (12.99)
SPREAD 0.585*** 0.521*** 0.266*
(233.60) (9.55) (3.30)
LTV -0.032*** -0.055*** -0.044***
(470.89) (64.29) (58.26)
AGE -0.172*** -0.548** -0.273
(10.18) (5.94) (1.77)
AGESQ -0.059*** -0.022 -0.053***
(140.52) (1.12) (7.76)
HSD 4.273*** 4.872*** 3.983**
(94.51) (8.27) (5.28)
LE 4.445*** 3.418*** 4.798***
(472.25) (15.07) (38.39)
DUM_IL -0.387*** -0.971** -1.039***
(19.65) (5.43) (7.04)
DUM_FL 0.147** 0.836*** 0.496**
(5.99) (9.65) (4.11)
DUM_CA 0.417*** 1.237*** 0.694**
(33.49) (12.35) (5.67)
Number of
  refinancings 3,522 177 218
Number of
  nonrefinancings 7,488 648 802
Pseudo 
  R-squareda 0.248 0.259 0.244
Chi-square of
  model 2805.72 214.56 250.31
Concordant
  ratio (percent) 79.2 81.0 80.5
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Source:  Authors’ calculations.
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SPREAD for good credits is approximately twice as
large as it is for bad credits, with a corresponding siz-
able drop in statistical significance in the latter case.
Similarly, we find that the coefficients on HSD are posi-
tive and highly significant, although slightly smaller
and somewhat less significant for the WRSTNOW=400
subsample. While high values of HSD indicate more
opportunities for a mortgagor’s option to be in the money,
such values have less impact on the refinancing probability
of credit-constrained borrowers. As expected, we find that
the coefficients of the variable SPREAD are uniformly sig-
nificant and positive across the subsamples.
Changes in home equity also have an important
influence on the probability of refinancing, as evidenced by
the negative sign and high level of significance of the LTV
ratio. We demonstrate the estimated effect of changes in house
price by plotting simulated values of the probability of refi-
nancing for different levels of the post-origination house price
as a percentage of the original purchase price (Chart 6). Note
that in Table 4, the coefficient on the LTV ratio is somewhat
larger for the bad credit group, suggesting that to some extent
there is a trade-off between equity and credit rating.
Lending environment is also significant and bears
the predicted sign, suggesting that increased lender
aggressiveness and consumer financial savvy have boosted
the probability that a loan will be refinanced. Again note
that the coefficient of LE is somewhat greater for bad cred-
its than for good credits, suggesting that an important ele-
ment of increased lender aggressiveness has been the
increase in subprime credit quality lending, or lending to
borrowers with credit histories worse than that required in
the A-paper market. Finally, AGE and AGESQ are signifi-
cant with negative signs, indicating that credit and equity
do not explain all of the decline in probability of refinanc-
ing as a mortgage ages.
These results emphasize the dependence of esti-
mates of interest rate sensitivities on credit factors. Pools of
mortgages with relatively high proportions of borrowers
with poor credit histories will experience significantly
slower prepayment speeds, all else being equal. Investors in
mortgage-backed securities are affected by the credit con-
ditions of the households represented in the underlying
pools of mortgages even though they may be insulated
against homeowner default per se. Moreover, our results
suggest that a change in the overall lending environment
has occurred over the past decade, probably because lenders
have become more aggressive and borrowers more sophisti-
cated. All else being equal, this change has increased the
probability that a homeowner will refinance.
EFFECTS OF AN IMPROVEMENT IN CREDIT RATING
The summary measures of credit history used in this study sug-
gest that the credit performance of many individuals in our
sample has improved: for these individuals, WRSTNOW has a
lower value than WRSTEVER. As Table 3 shows, 8.0 per-
cent of the sample have a WRSTEVER of 400 (the worst
credit classification) and a WRSTNOW of 1 (the best
credit classification).
To investigate the extent to which improvement
in a homeowner’s credit history affects the probability of
refinancing, we first select all those cases in which
WRSTEVER is 400 (18.4 percent of the total sample). We
then divide that group into three subsamples based on the
extent of improvement: WRSTEVER=400, WRSTNOW=1;
WRSTEVER=400, 1<WRSTNOW<400; and WRSTEVER=400,
WRSTNOW=400. Next we estimate our model, absentFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1997 95
the credit history variable, over these three subsamples. We
find that the coefficients on SPREAD and HSD are larger
for the subsample with the greatest improvement than for
the subsample with no improvement. These results provide
some support for the hypothesis that improvement in one’s
credit rating increases the probability of refinancing (Table 5). 
SIMULATING THE EFFECTS OF CREDIT
AND EQUITY ON THE PROBABILITY
OF REFINANCING
Using the separately estimated equations for the WRSTNOW=1
and WRSTNOW= 400 subsamples, we simulate values for
the probability of refinancing for hypothetical individuals
with different credit histories and different values of the
post-origination LTV ratio (Table 6). The four columns of
this table represent alternative combinations of the vari-
ables WRSTNOW and the LTV ratio. Moving down each
column, we see that the variable SPREAD rises from 0 to
300 basis points, an increase that should normally motivate
refinancing. The first column, with WRSTNOW=1 and
the post-origination LTV ratio=60 percent, shows how
an individual who is neither equity- nor credit-constrained
would react to an increase in SPREAD. Note that with
SPREAD=0, the probability of refinancing is 0.29, sug-
gesting that refinancings motivated by the desire to extract
equity from the property are fairly high among this group.
As SPREAD rises to 300 basis points, the probability of
refinancing essentially doubles, reaching nearly 60 percent.
In the second column, where the LTV ratio=100 percent,
the probabilities drop sharply; at SPREAD=0, the proba-
bility is just 0.1, while at SPREAD=300, the probability is
0.32, about half of that when the LTV ratio=60 percent. 
In contrast, the third and fourth columns
depict an individual who is severely credit-constrained
(WRSTNOW=400). As suggested above, having substantial
equity can overcome many of the problems associated with
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Note:  Figures in parentheses are chi-square statistics.
aPseudo R-squared is defined in Estrella (1997).
* Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 5









CONSTANT 2.860*** 3.455*** 2.245***
(18.43) (5.76) (12.99)
SPREAD 0.540*** 0.721*** 0.266
(12.77) (4.579) (3.30)
LTV -0.050*** -0.063*** -0.044***
(65.80) (23.19) (58.26)
HSD 6.252*** 2.357 3.983***
(13.45) (0.26) (5.28)
AGE -0.536*** -0.404 -0.273
(6.64) (0.65) (1.77)
AGESQ -0.040*** -0.073 -0.053***
(4.652) (1.97) (7.76)
LE 4.981*** 3.970*** 4.798***
(38.64) (5.10) (38.39)
DUM_IL -0.703*** -0.846 -1.039***
(4.24) (0.86) (7.04)
DUM_FL 0.579*** 1.311*** 0.496***
(5.36) (5.29) (4.11)
DUM_CA 1.183*** 2.626*** 0.694***
(14.35) (11.94) (5.67)
Number of
  refinancings 221 55 218
Number of 
  nonrefinancings 788 249 802
Pseudo 
  R-squareda 0.260 0.339 0.244
Chi-square of
  model 264.74 101.96 250.31
Concordant
  ratio (percent) 81.3 86.3 80.5
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Note:  The simulated probabilities were obtained using models summarized in 
Table 4.
Table 6
PROBABILITY OF REFINANCING UNDER ALTERNATIVE 












0 0.29 0.11 0.34 0.11
100 0.38 0.16 0.36 0.12
200 0.48 0.23 0.37 0.13
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a poor credit history, particularly because more lenders have
moved into subprime lending programs. With the LTV
ratio=60 percent, probabilities of refinancing are essen-
tially the same at SPREAD=0 and SPREAD=100 as in
the WRSTNOW=1 case. However, without substantial
equity (an LTV ratio=100 percent), the probability of
refinancing is not only low but also unresponsive to
increases in SPREAD.
Additional simulations test the marginal effect on
the probability of refinancing of relevant changes in the
model’s other explanatory variables (Table 7). We saw in Table 1
that the mean value for LE for refinancers is 24 basis points.
The results reported in Table 7 indicate that, all else being
equal, this mean value of LE results in a 0.2 increase in the
probability of refinancing. Comparing Table 7 with Table 6,
we conclude that the change in the lending environment over
the past decade has had an effect on the probability of refi-
nancing equivalent to moving from an LTV ratio of 100 per-
cent to an LTV ratio of 60 percent—a very powerful effect.
Similarly, each year in which a loan ages reduces the probabil-
ity of refinancing by 0.1, all else being equal. 
CONCLUSION
Our analysis provides compelling evidence that a poor
credit history significantly reduces the probability that a
homeowner will refinance a mortgage, even when the
financial incentive for doing so appears strong. Moreover,
consistent with previous studies, we find that refinancing
probabilities are quite sensitive to the amount of equity a
homeowner has in his or her property. Homeowners with
poor credit histories and low equity positions cannot easily
meet lenders’ underwriting criteria, so they are often
blocked from obtaining the replacement financing neces-
sary to prepay their existing mortgage.
On another level, this research contributes to the
evidence that households’ financial conditions can have sig-
nificant effects on the channels through which declines in
interest rates influence the overall economy. From the
broadest viewpoint, mortgage refinancings can be
viewed as redistributions of cash flows among house-
holds or investment intermediaries. For those households
able to reduce costs by locking in a lower interest rate
on their mortgage, refinancing is likely to have a wealth
or permanent income effect that might boost overall
consumption spending. Conversely, to the extent that
households are unable to obtain replacement financing
at lower interest rates because of deteriorated credit histories
or erosion of equity, the stimulative effect on consumption
would likely be less.
Of course, refinancing decisions also affect the
investors in the various cash flows generated by pools of
mortgages. When homeowners refinance, those investors
lose above-market-rate income streams and so are keenly
interested in any factors that may have a significant bear-
ing on the probability of refinancing. This analysis demon-
strates that, in addition to monitoring changes in interest
rates and home prices, those investors should be concerned
with the credit histories of the homeowners represented in
a particular pool of mortgages as well as trends in those
credit histories over time. Despite guarantees against credit
risk, the relative proportions of credit-constrained house-
holds represented in pools of mortgages will have a signifi-
cant impact on the prepayment behavior of those pools
under various interest rate and home price scenarios.
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Note:  Changes for LE and HSD are roughly equal to a change of one standard 
deviation.
Table 7
MARGINAL EFFECT OF OTHER EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
ON THE PROBABILITY OF REFINANCING
Variable Change in Variable Change in Probability
LE +25 basis points +0.20
HSD +5 basis points +0.04
AGE +1 year -0.10APPENDIX:  MODELING THE DECISION TO REFINANCE 
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A homeowner decides to refinance by comparing the
costs of continuing to hold the current mortgage with
the costs of obtaining a new mortgage, both evaluated
over some expected holding period. For simplicity, let
B* represent the difference between the cost of con-
tinuing to hold the mortgage at the original rate and
the cost of refinancing at the current rate, discounted
over the expected duration of the loan. The variable B*
represents the net benefit from refinancing; if B* is
positive, the homeowner would want to refinance.
Although this notional desire to refinance,
measured by B*, is not observable, we can observe
some of the key factors that determine it. Such factors
include the difference between the homeowner’s cur-
rent mortgage interest rate and the prevailing market
interest rate at the time this decision is being evalu-
ated (SPREAD), the homeowner’s credit history
(WRSTNOW), the amount of equity in the property
(LTV), the number of months since the origination of
the existing mortgage (AGE), the volatility of mort-
gage interest rates since origination (HSD), and any
changes in the lending environment since origination
that may have reduced the financial, psychic, or oppor-
tunity costs of obtaining a loan (LE). Thus, we can
express B* as a function of these explanatory variables:
(A1)   
where the subscript (i) represents the i-th mortgage
holder and ui represents the error term. We assume for
Bi￿ D0 D1SPREADi D2WRSTNOWi
D3LTV
i





simplicity that the relationship between B* and the
factors that determine it is linear.
The decision to refinance can be expressed as a
simple binary choice that assumes:
(A2) ri = 1 if       (refinancing)
ri = 0 if       (no refinancing).
Equations A1 and A2 jointly represent an econometric
model of binary choice. If the net benefit from refinancing
is positive, we would expect on average that the i-th
homeowner would refinance (represented by binary
outcome ri = 1); otherwise the individual would not
(outcome ri = 0). We estimate the parameters of the
binary choice model (that is, [ ,  , . . . . ,  ])
using maximum likelihood logit analysis (for more
details, see Maddala [1983] and Green [1993]).
Noting the significant interaction effects between
the creditworthiness measure and the other explanatory
variables, and the uncertainty over whether WRSTNOW
is a continuous or categorical variable, we develop an alter-
native to an estimation of equation A1 by dividing the
sample into subsamples based on the various values of
WRSTNOW, dropping WRSTNOW as an explanatory
variable, and estimating the resulting equation, A3, over





Bi￿ D0 D1SPREADi D2LTV
i
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ENDNOTES
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Asset Trading and Finance and Jonathan Raiff is a first vice president in
Mortgage Strategy at PaineWebber Incorporated. The authors wish to thank
Elizabeth Reynolds for outstanding technical support on this paper.
1. Another factor that may have impeded a borrower’s ability to
refinance is a decline in household income. Unfortunately, the data set
used in this study does not include information on an individual
borrower’s income at the time of the initial purchase of the home or
afterward.
2. In the literature on this topic, a distinction is made between the
values of LTV ratios, income, and credit history at the time the mortgage
loan is originated (the origination values) and the values of those variables
at some point in time after the origination (the post-origination values).
The post-origination values are the most relevant for the decision to
prepay a mortgage, but they also tend to be the most difficult on which
to obtain data. 
3. Homeowners’ assessments of the current market values of their
properties may be biased, particularly during periods when there are
significant changes in those values. See, for example, DiPasquale and
Sommerville (1995) and Goodman and Ittner (1992).
4. Case Shiller Weiss, Inc., of Cambridge, Massachusetts, provided
these home price indexes.
5. See Follain, Scott, and Yang (1992) and Follain and Tzang (1988). 
6. The interest rate on existing loans C is not directly observed in the
data base. An estimate of that interest rate can be derived from
information on the original loan balance, original maturity, and periodic
readings of the amortized balance, which is reported in the TRW credit
reports discussed below.
Strictly speaking, an interval of thirty to sixty days usually separates
the date of application for a mortgage from the date of closing, although
borrowers typically have the option of locking in the interest rate at the
time of application or letting the rate float, in some cases up to the date
of closing. We experimented with lagging the national average mortgage
interest rate by one and then two months and found that in neither case
were the results significantly different from those we obtained using the
average rate for the month in which the loan closed.
7. In a more technical version of this study, we tested four alternative,
increasingly complex measures of the incentive to refinance. Details on
the definitions and specifications of these measures, as well as the
estimation results, are presented in Peristiani et al. (1996). 
8. For example, Archer, Ling, and McGill (1995) assign to those
observations that did not refinance the lowest monthly average
Freddie Mac commitment rate on thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages over
the two-year time interval of their study.
9. In the technical version of this study (Peristiani et al. 1996), we use
total derogatories as an explanatory variable in determining the probability
of refinancing and find it to be highly significant with the predicted sign,
although somewhat less significant than WRSTNOW or WRSTEVER.
10. In fact, each variable can take on more values than those listed. For
example, a value of 34 indicates that an individual is persistently thirty
days late. For the purposes of this study, we have constrained WRSTNOW
and WRSTEVER to take on only those values cited in the text.
11. To an increasing extent, mortgage lenders are relying on a single
credit score summarizing the vast amount of information on an
individual’s credit report. For an overview of this issue, see Avery, Bostic,
Calem, and Canner (1996). As an extension of the research on the effect
of credit histories on mortgage refinancings, credit scores could also be
tested as an alternative measure of creditworthiness. 
12. For additional information on these alternative specifications,
see Peristiani et al. (1996).
13. The presence of second mortgages and home equity loans
introduces additional considerations into the issue of refinancing. On
the one hand, second mortgages and home equity loans would tend to
reduce a homeowner’s equity. On the other hand, since second
mortgages and home equity loans typically have interest rates well
above the rates on first mortgage loans, the spread based on the
homeowner’s weighted-average cost of credit would likely be higher.
Although the MRG data base indicates the presence and amount of
second mortgages and home equity loans taken out since the original
purchase, we do not investigate their effect on refinancing
probabilities. This is an area for future research.
14. As noted earlier, the sample excludes observations with AGE of less
than twelve months. 
15. Dividing the sample into three subsamples based on credit rating is
equivalent to estimating the model over the entire sample with dummy
variables for the three credit classifications and fully interacting those
dummy variables with the other explanatory variables of the model.REFERENCES
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